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Theories of Domination and Labour Law: An Alternative Conception for Intervention? 
 
David Cabrelli* and Rebecca Zahn** 
 
1. Introduction 
In previous work, the authors sought to demonstrate how a particular strand of political 
theory could be usefully adopted to shed valuable light on labour law.1 In short, the 
FRQFHSWLRQ RI µQRQ-GRPLQDWLRQ¶ JURXQGHG LQ FRQWHPSRUDU\ FLYLF UHSXEOLFDQ SROLWLFDO
philosophy and associated with scholars such as Philip Pettit and Frank Lovett2 lays down 
sophisticated accounts of (i) freedom and (ii) a socially just order. In this framework, (i) 
freedom, according to Pettit, and (ii) social justice LQ /RYHWW¶V version of this theory, is 
secured when laws and policies are introduced to subject private social relationships 
characterised by dependency and an arbitrary imbalance in social power to a measure of 
effective external controls. As a subset of a socially just order, the previous work of the 
authors sought to sketch out how /RYHWW¶V LQFDUQDWLRQ RI non-domination theory had the 
potential to act as a coherent justification for labour laws. This conception would regard 
ODERXUODZVDVDVHWRIPHDVXUHVWKDWDUHGHVLJQHGWRDFKLHYHDGHJUHHRIµQRQ-GRPLQDWLRQ¶LQ
the employment relationship. Labour law could achieve this by introducing legal and policy 
FRQWUROVOLPLWLQJWKHHPSOR\HH¶VGHSHQGHQFHRQKLVKHUHPSOR\HUDQGUHVWULFWLQJWKHDUELWUDU\
power imbalance inherent in the relationship between the employer and the employee. By 
serving to tone down the level of arbitrary decision-making vested in the employer, the 
dependency of the employee on the employer, and/or by counterbalancing the degree of 
power wielded by the employer, it was argued that procedural and substantive labour laws 
such as unfair dismissal, minimum wage laws, working time controls, and collective labour 
and trade union rights could well be perceived as measures that are consistent with a legal 
IUDPHZRUNGHVLJQHGWRVHFXUHDGHJUHHRIµQRQ-GRPLQDWLRQ¶RIWKHZRUNHU 
To that extent, this article builds on the exposition of the position put forward by the 
authors in a prior paper.3 Yet, where it represents a marked departure from that previous work 
is in the diffidence (at best), and scepticism (at worst), with which it confronts the non-
domination thread of civic republicanism as a rationale for labour law, as well as in the level 
of engagement with that theory in terms of a sustained evaluation of its strengths and 
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weaknesses as a justificatory account for the subject. As such, the purpose of this exercise is 
to summarise the various advantages of non-domination theory as a justification for labour 
laws before moving on to test rigorously the purchase of this model by addressing the range 
of objections that can be levelled at it as a justificatory framework. Overall, the paper 
recognises the limits inherent in the application of civic republican non-domination theories 
of political philosophy to labour law (see, in particular, VHFWLRQRQµWUDQVSODQWDELOLW\¶More 
pertinently, the prescriptions for relationships blighted by domination that are suggested by 
Lovett and Pettit are arguably lacking in ambition and could be much more radical. An 
ancillary point to make at the outset is that rather than attempt to cast doubt on, or critique, 
other key accounts for the subject, this paper does not claim that non-domination provides an 
exhaustive account so that it ought to be treated as the exclusive value that labour laws ought 
to promote. Instead, the argument is presented within a spirit favouring the co-existence of 
different goals for the discipline, whether selective or universal in their nature.4  This 
endeavour will be pursued primarily within the context of UK labour laws.  
Section 2 provides a distillation of non-domination theory and explains how it can prima 
facie account for labour laws. Section 3 sketches out some of the merits of such an approach, 
whilst section 4 moves on to engage in a comprehensive evaluation of the objections. Finally, 
section 5 concludes, with the general proposition that althougK 3HWWLW¶V DQG /RYHWW¶V QRQ-
domination model is insufficient to act as an abstract justificatory theory for labour laws, it 
can act as a driver for specific labour laws; and more specifically, for a particular conception 
or form of labour law that promotes a distinctive set of regulatory techniques, and vision of 
the role and function of the central notion of the contract of employment. The primary 
significance of this article rests in the insight that domination-based narratives of civic 
republicanism have the capacity to act as a bridge between existing individual, relational, 
autonomous, substantive and procedural accounts of the regulation of the law of the contract 
of employment5 DQGSROLWLFDOSKLORVRSK\DµQHZQRUPDWLYLW\¶6 albeit one that is restricted in 
scope. 
 
2. µ1RQ-GRPLQDWLRQ¶7KHRU\'LVWLOOHG 
 
Commentators have stressed the importance of injecting clarity into the objectives and goals 
that labour laws are formulated to meet and achieve.7 Once these purposes have been 
                                                          
4 G. Davidov, A Purposive Approach to Labour Law (Oxford, OUP, 2016) 68-71, G. 'DYLGRYµ6HWWLQJ/DERXU
/DZ¶V&RYHUDJH%HWZHHQ8QLYHUVDOLVPDQG6HOHFWLYLW\¶Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 543 and L. 
Rodgers, Labour Law, Vulnerability and the Regulation of Precarious Work (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2016) 
41-45 and 92-93. 
5 ' %URGLH ³+RZ 5HODWLRQDO LV WKH (PSOR\PHQW &RQWUDFW"¶   Industrial Law Journal 232 and D. 
Brodie,  ³5HODWLRQDO&RQWUDFWV´LQ0)UHHGODQGHWDOHGVThe Contract of Employment (Oxford, OUP, 2016) 
145 
6 $ %RJJ ³5HSXEOLFDQ 1RQ-Domination and Labour Law: New NRUPDWLYLW\ RU 7URMDQ +RUVH"´  >[@
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations [xxx]. 
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International Labour Review 311, H. Collins, 
µ7KHRULHVRI5LJKWVDV-XVWLILFDWLRQV¶ LQ*'DYLGRYDQG%/DQJLOOH HGV The Idea of Labour Law (Oxford, 
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clarified, it becomes more straightforward to identify the justifications that ought to be 
invoked in favour of the discipline, as well as its distinctive attributes providing support for 
its treatment as an autonomous field of law and study.8 The authors have suggested in 
previous work that by drawing on the diverse methods, analytical approaches and schools of 
thought employed in civic republican philosophy, labour lawyers can illuminate their subject 
and discover fresh insights. Engagement with civic republicanism also has the capacity to 
inform and enhance the study of the discipline. By approaching labour law from a political 
philosophical perspective, this technique follows a well-trodden path insofar as labour law 
traditionally has always been treated as a contextual field of study, albeit possessing its own 
autonomy and internal logic as a legal subject.9 That is to say that the tendency in the past has 
been for labour law to be viewed through a sociological prism as a means of improving our 
understanding of the subject, thus underscoring its interdisciplinary credentials.10 In recent 
years, the sociological and anthropological approach to labour law study exemplified by 
classic scholars such as Sinzheimer and Kahn-Freund has waned,11 and been replaced to 
some extent by other frameworksHJWKHµODZRIWKHODERXUPDUNHW¶DFFRXQW.12 This piece is 
partly motivated by a desire to view the subject within an alternative contextual frame, 
namely one that is rooted in a political and democratic frame of reference rather than an 
anthropological, economic or sociological setting. 
The civic republican agenda contains a number of diverse strands with a broad range 
of proponents. Hence, there is no single or uniform account. There are, however, two main 
schools of thought. First, theorists such as Philip Pettit and Frank Lovett advance a model 
which LVEDVHGHQWLUHO\RQDSDUWLFXODUFRQFHSWLRQRIWKHQRWLRQRIµGRPLQDWLRQ¶. Pettit defines 
the concept of µfreedom¶ against that principal value, as does Lovett in the case of the idea¶ of 
µVRFLDO MXVWLFH¶. In essence, µfreedom¶ and µsocial justice¶ are conceptualised as conditions 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
283*'DYLGRY³$UWLFXODWLQJ WKH,GHDRI/DERXU/DZ:K\DQG+RZ´European Labour 
Law Journal 130, and G. Davidov, A Purposive Approach to Labour Law (Oxford, OUP, 2016) 13-33. 
8 * 'DYLGRY µ6HWWLQJ /DERXU /DZ¶V &RYHUDJH %HWZHHQ 8QLYHUVDOLVP DQG 6HOHFWLYLW\¶   Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 543, 547± $ %RJJ & &RVWHOOR $&/ 'DYLHV DQG - 3UDVVO ³/DERXU /DZ¶V
$XWRQRP\7KHRU\DQG0HWKRGRORJ\´LQ$%RJJ&&RVWHOOR$&/'DYLHV-3UDVVOHGVThe Autonomy 
of Labour Law +DUW   0 )UHHGODQG µ2WWR .DKQ-Freund, the Contract of Employment and the 
$XWRQRP\RI/DERXU/DZ¶LQ$%RJJ&&RVWHOOR$&/'DYLHV-3UDVVOHGVThe Autonomy of Labour 
Law +DUWDQG+&ROOLQVµ&RQWUDFWXDO $XWRQRP\¶LQ$%RJJ&&RVWHOOR$&/'DYLHV-3UDVVO
(eds), The Autonomy of Labour Law (Hart 2015) 45. 
9 +&ROOLQVµ&RQWUDFWXDO$XWRQRP\¶LQ$%RJJ&&RVWHOOR$&/'DYLHV-3UDVVOHGVThe Autonomy of 
Labour Law (Hart 2015) 45, 50-52. 
10 For example, the once-SHUYDVLYH µFROOHFWLYH ODLVVH]-IDLUH¶ SDUDGLJP for the discipline in the UK: O. Kahn-
)UHXQG µ/HJDO)UDPHZRUN¶ LQ$)ODQGHUVDQG+&OHJJ The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain 
(Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1954) 42, 53 and O. Kahn-)UHXQGµ/DERXU/DZ¶LQLaw and Opinion in England in 
the 20th Century (London, Stevens, 1959). 
11 0)UHHGODQGµ*HQHUDO,QWURGXFWLRQ± $LPV5DWLRQDOHDQG0HWKRGRORJ\¶LQ0)UHHGODQGHWDOHGVThe 
Contract of Employment (Oxford, OUP, 2016) 6-11 and R. Dukes, The Labour Constitution (Oxford, OUP, 
2015) 104-108. 
12 6'HDNLQµ$1HZ3DUDGLJPIRU/DERXU/DZ"$5HYLHZRI&$UXS3*DKDQ-+RZH5-RKQVWRQH5
0LWFKHOO $ 2¶'RQQHOO HGV Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation: Essays on the Construction, 
Constitution and Regulation of Labour Markets and Work Relationships 6\GQH\7KH)HGHUDWLRQ3UHVV¶
(2007) 31 Melbourne University Law Review 1161, 1170-1171 and S. Deakin and F. Wilkinson, The Law of the 
Labour Market: Industrialization, Employment, and Legal Evolution (Oxford, OUP, 2005). 
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WKDW GHPDQG µQRQ-GRPLQDWLRQ¶. As such, a VLWXDWLRQ ZKHUH $ LV QRW µGRPLQDWHG¶ E\ % ZLOO
UHVXOWLQ$¶VµIUHHGRP¶according to Pettit, or A being situated in a socially just legal order in 
WHUPVRI/RYHWW¶VPRGHO. /RYHWW¶VDQG3HWWLW¶VGHVFULSWLYHFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQVRIµGRPLQDWLRQ¶
as a phenomenon are both robust enough, although subject to certain modifications suggested 
below. Although both Pettit and Lovett adopt a sophisticated account of the scope of 
economic domination, neither calls for any significant re-organization of workplaces, the 
labour market or worker or political control of productive resources in order to minimize the 
level of managerial domination at work. In fact, Lovett¶V SUHVFULSWLRQ for the reduction of 
domination - which is based on the conferral of a universal and unconditional basic income, a 
frictionless right to quit employment and the operation of the free market - is arguably 
LQDGHTXDWHDQGSRWHQWLDOO\GHUHJXODWRU\RI ODERXU ODZZKLOVW3HWWLW¶VDSSURDFK LV HTXLYRFDO
and tepid as regards the desirability of collective labour laws such as the law of industrial 
action and the right to strike.13 )RU WKDW UHDVRQ ZKLOVW /RYHWW¶V DQG 3HWWLW¶V PRGHOV RI
µGRPLQDWLRQ¶DUHDFFHSWHGit is assumed in this paper that their prescriptions are rejected.  
The second main incarnation of civic republican thought is workplace republicanism. 
This formulation advances a more radical and socially progressive agenda for workplace 
governance and the labour market and is associated with thinkers such as Gourevitch,14 
Anderson,15 Hsieh,16 González-Ricoy17 and Schuppert.18 Each of the workplace republicans, 
to a greater or lesser extent, offer up a normative case for restructuring how the workplace is 
organised and governed, as a means of toning down managerial authoritarianism. In this 
article, the focus is on the first, and most mainstream and prominent, strand of civic 
republican thought, i.e. the account of domination encountered in the thinking of Pettit and 
Lovett, rather than the competing conception adhered to by workplace republicans, which is 
the subject of a separate paper by Keith Breen in this special issue.  
The conception of non-domination as µIUHHGRP¶ DQG µVRFLDO justice¶ within 3HWWLW¶V
and /RYHWW¶V DFFRXQWs of civic republication theory provides an opportunity to once again 
stress the contextual credentials of labour law as a subject, i.e. by testing WKH VXEMHFW¶V
relationship with political thought. Both 3HWWLW¶V DQG /RYHWW¶V PRGHOV are political theories 
that prize the mitigation of domination. In this paper, however, Lovett¶VIUDPHZRUN is used as 
the relevant proxy for analysis, VLQFHLWDUJXDEO\VXSSOLHVDGHILQLWLRQRIµGRPLQDWLRQ¶WKDWLV
richer and more refined than that of Pettit: iQ SDUWLFXODU /RYHWW LQFOXGHV WKH ´GHSHQGHQF\´
variable (2) below as a key element of his definition RI´GRPLQDWLRQ´DVZHOODVDVOLJKWO\GLIIHUHQW
                                                          
13 $ %RJJ ³5HSXEOLFDQ 1RQ-'RPLQDWLRQ DQG /DERXU /DZ 1HZ 1RUPDWLYLW\ RU 7URMDQ +RUVH"´  >[@
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations [xxx]. 
14 See A. *RXUHYLWFK µ/DERUDQGUHSXEOLFDQ OLEHUW\¶  Constellations 431±54 and A. Gourevitch, 
µ/DERUUHSXEOLFDQLVPDQGWKHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIZRUN¶Political Theory 591±617. 
15 ($QGHUVRQ µ(TXDOLW\DQGIUHHGRPLQ WKHZRUNSODFH UHFRYHULQJUHSXEOLFDQ LQVLJKWV¶  Social 
Philosophy and Policy 48±69. 
16 N.-++VLHKµ5DZOVLDQMXVWLFHDQGZRUNSODFHUHSXEOLFDQLVP¶Social Theory and Practice 115±
42. 
17 I. González-5LFR\µThe republicDQFDVHIRUZRUNSODFHGHPRFUDF\¶ Social Theory and Practice, 
232±54. 
18 )6FKXSSHUWµBeing equal: analysing the nature of social egalitarian UHODWLRQVKLSV¶in C. Fourie, F. Schuppert, 
and I. Wallimann-Helmer, eds. Social Equality: on what is means to be equals. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015, 107±25 
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XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIDUELWUDU\SRZHULQUHVSHFWRIWKH´DUELWUDULQHVV´YDULDEOHEHORZ.19 Lovett posits 
that domination will be present where there is an arbitrary imbalance in power in the context 
of a dependent private µsocial relationship¶.20 As such, there are three variables present in this 
formulation in the sense that domination reigns over A if:  
 
(1)  an imbalance in the distribution of social, coercive, or market power operates 
in favour of B insofar as B exerts greater coercive social or market power over 
A than A wields over B WKH³SRZHULPEDODQFH´YDULDEOH;21  
 
(2)  A must be dependent on his/her private social relationship with B to some 
extent WKH³GHSHQGHQF\´YDULDEOH;22 and  
 
(3)  the structure of the relationship between A and B must entail B being afforded 
the discretion to exercise power over A in an arbitrary fashion, i.e. to the 
extent that that power can be exercised without any effective or external 
constraints WKH³DUELWUDULQHVV´YDULDEOH.23 
 
Before we develop this line of thought any further, we must first broach the question of the 
descriptive accuracy of this model within the context of employment. In other words, is it 
accurate to depict the employment relationship as one that is generally characterised by 
domination in the absence of any external or effective legal or policy controls? Alternatively, 
does it offer little more than Kahn-)UHXQG¶V FODVVLF µLQHTXDOLW\ RI EDUJDLQLQJ SRZHU¶24 
account?25 Subject to the criticisms further discussed in section 4 below, it is suggested that, 
in the abstract, the employment relationship can  undoubtedly be cast as one that is tainted by 
µGRPLQDWLRQ¶; in particular, to the extent that ± in its natural state and as such, in the absence 
of labour laws prescribed by the common law or employment protection legislation that 
promote or protect the interests of the employee26 ± the employment relationship subjects an 
employee to the exercise of market and social power at the hands of his/her employer via the 
managerial prerogative, which largely outweighs any power he/she may enjoy over the 
                                                          
19 Contrast F. Lovett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2010) 9, 119-123 and 
chapters 2 to 4 with P. Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, OUP, 1999) 52-
56, 33HWWLW³)UHHGRPLQWKH0DUNHW´3ROLWLFV3hilosophy and Economics 131, 138 and P. Pettit, On 
WKH 3HRSOH¶V 7HUPV A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy, (Cambridge, CUP, 2012) chapter 1. 
However, /RYHWW¶VUHIRUPDJHQGDWRDFKLHYHQRQ-domination is arguably overly restrained. 
20 )RU D WUHQFKDQW FULWLFLVP RI /RYHWW¶V DSSURDFK WR µVRFLDO UHODWLRQVKLSV¶ VHH $ %RJJ ³5HSXEOLFDQ 1RQ-
Domination and Labour Law: New NRUPDWLYLW\ RU 7URMDQ +RUVH"´  >[@ International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations [xxx]. 
21 F. Lovett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2010) 74-78 and 120. 
22 F. Lovett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2010) 34-40, 49-52 and 120. 
23 F. Lovett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2010) 95-101 and 120. 
24 P. Davies and M. Freedland (eds), Kahn-)UHXQG¶V/DERXUDQGWKH/DZ, 3rd edition (London, Stevens, 1983) 
18. 
25 For the interesting links between civic republican thought and inequality of bargaining power, see the 
GLVFXVVLRQ LQ 6 :KLWH ³7KH 5HSXEOLFDQ &ULWLTXH RI &DSLWDOLVP´   Critical Review of International 
Social and Political Philosophy 561, 565-567. 
26 )RUDFULWLTXHRIWKHWHQGHQF\RISROLWLFDOWKHRULHVWRLQYRNHFRQFHSWVVXFKDVWKHµQDWXUDOVWDWH¶RUµRULJLQDO
SRVLWLRQ¶SDUWLFXODUO\within the context of labour relationships, see section 4below. 
6 
 
employer. Hence, the power imbalance variable (1) above is satisfied. Of course, the common 
law via the implied terms of the employment contract (such as the duty of fidelity and 
loyalty, the duty to follow reasonable instructions, etc.) function to support the interests of the 
employer in terms of its exercise of the managerial prerogative. Nonetheless, in the absence 
of such implied terms, it is submitted that the bureaucratic power inherent in the HPSOR\HU¶V
organisation that envelops the employment relation within an overarching authoritarian 
structure27 - also known as the managerial prerogative - is sufficient of itself to establish a 
KLHUDUFKLFDOSRZHUG\QDPLFE\ZKLFK WKHHPSOR\HH LVERXQG WRFRQIRUPWR WKHHPSOR\HU¶V
practical authority that satisfies variable (1) above.  
The dynamics of the managerial prerogative also function to enable the employer to 
exercise a measure of arbitrary control over the employee, i.e. the arbitrariness variable (3) 
above: in shorthand, the state or condition of the employee28  is largely responsible for the 
satisfaction of these two factors (1) and (3) above that are necessary for the establishment of a 
relationship characterised by domination. Of course, labour laws, through techniques 
involving the imposition of managerial duties to listen or consult and go through due process 
(prior to formal decision-making), unfair dismissal laws and the implied term of good faith or 
mutual trust and confidence, are designed to offset or temper such arbitrary discretion. As 
such, one might object that, by definition, in such a case, there can be no domination in the 
employment relationship, as the requisite arbitrariness component (3) has been removed or 
minimised. However, of course, at this stage we are exploring the position of the employee in 
the abstract, where such protective common laws or legislation are absent. Hence, in such a 
context, the employment relationship is in its raw and unembellished state, with employees 
faced by the managerial prerogative reflecting the practical authority and interests of the 
employer. Another potential difficulty with the inclusion of the arbitrariness factor (3) ± 
whereby a party to a relationship is subject to the will or pleasure of the other party to the 
relationship, without any effective or external constraints29 ± concerns its over-inclusivity 
inasmuch as it could conceivably cover a multitude of market transactions. In this sense, the 
criticism is that the formulation is too broad and can be treated as of little utility for labour 
law. This objection can be addressed on two grounds. First, LWVKRXOGEHVWUHVVHGWKDW/RYHWW¶V
framework is concerned with the promotion of a form of social justice in a broad range of 
strategic social relationships characterised by domination. In other words, it is not confined to 
labour relationships. If we think of labour laws as a set of regulatory techniques that minimise 
                                                          
27 +XJK &ROOLQV µ0DUNHW Power, Bureaucratic Power, and the Contract of Employment (1986) 15 Industrial 
Law Journal 1. 
28 2IFRXUVHWKLVLVWUDGLWLRQDOO\UHIHUUHGWRDVµVXERUGLQDWLRQ¶LQWKHODERXUODZOLWHUDWXUH 
29 7KHUHLVDFULWLFLVPWKDWWKHµZLWKRXWDQ\HIIHFWLYHRUH[WHUQDOFRQVWUDLQWV¶HOHPHQWRIWKH arbitrariness variable 
would signify an absence of domination ± and as such, no justification for labour laws ± if an employee has 
DGYDQFHNQRZOHGJHRIWKHUXOHVDQGFRQYHQWLRQVDSSOLFDEOHWRWKHHPSOR\HU¶VEHKDYLRXU,QWKLVZD\/RYHWW¶V
domination model is narrower than it needs to be for the purposes of labour law. This objection also reflects 
/RYHWW¶V SURFHGXUDO UDWKHU WKDQ VXEVWDQWLYH FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ RI WKH DUELWUDULQHVV YDULDEOH  DERYH VHH F. 
Lovett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2010) 112-119), on which, see A. Bogg, 
³5HSXEOLFDQ1RQ-Domination and Labour Law: New NRUPDWLYLW\RU7URMDQ+RUVH"´  >[@ International 
Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations [xxx]. It can be addressed in two ways: first, by 
PRGLI\LQJ /RYHWW¶V VFKHPH WR UHPRYH WKH µZLWKRXW DQ\ HIIHFWLYH RU H[WHUQDO FRQVWUDLQWV¶ HOHPHQW VR WKDW WKH
DUELWUDULQHVV YDULDEOH  DERYH KLQJHV H[FOXVLYHO\ RQ WKH µZLOO RU SOHDVXUH¶ IDFWRU; or, secondly by adopting 
%RJJ¶VDSSURDFKZKLFK LQYROYHV WKHVXEVWLWXWLRQRI/RYHWW¶VSURFHGXUDO LQFDUQDWLRQRI WKHDUELWUDULQHVV IDFWRU
(3) for a substantive one. 
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PDQDJHPHQW¶VHQWLWOHPHQW WRDUELWUDULO\ LQWHUIHUH LQ WKHODERXUUHODWLRQVKLSZHFDQ WKLQNRI
the discipline as a subset of a broader legal and political order that is socially just. This 
explains the breadth of the arbitrary discretion variable (3). Secondly, it is important to recall 
the point that there iVQRµGRPLQDWLRQ¶XQOHVVthe arbitrariness variable (3) is accompanied by 
the (1) power imbalance and (2) dependency variables, i.e. arbitrary power in a market 
exchange, of itself, whilst necessary, is not sufficient for that relationship to be characterised 
by domination. In other words, although a market exchange may be tainted by arbitrariness in 
favour of B, a party A will not be dominated by B in the absence of a power imbalance 
(variable (1) above) in favour of B or dependency (variable (2) above) on the part of A on 
his/her relationship with B. 
Finally, if we turn to element (2) above, the average employee is clearly dependent on 
his/her employer. For instance, the employee will generally need to continue the specific 
relationship with the employer for subsistence reasons, owing to the basic inability to spread 
his/her risks amongst a suite of different employers, or simply because the costs of exiting 
his/her job are too high. Although certain labour laws such as minimum wage prescriptions 
can reduce such financial dependency, in the absence of such laws, the position of the worker 
is particularly susceptible to poverty wages or remuneration below the living wage.  
One of the problematical effects of casting dependency as an essential element of 
domination is that a high level of dependency of an employee on an employer in an 
employment relationship is portrayed in an adverse light, when in fact it might be useful in 
order to establish a degree of trust and security. Seen from this perspective, it might be 
considered misconceived to depict dependency as a negative feature. Moreover, there is some 
force in the contention that dependency is a separate vulnerability, rather than a precondition 
for domination, e.g. that a power imbalance (1) above and arbitrariness (3) above, should be 
sufficient to constitute domination.30 $Q DGGLWLRQDO GLIILFXOW\ ZLWK /RYHWW¶V DSSURDFK WR 
dependency is that E\SUHGLFDWLQJLWRQWKHQRWLRQRIHPSOR\HHV¶H[LWFRVWV it will not exist 
ZKHUH WKH HPSOR\HH¶V IUHHGRP WR TXLW RU H[LW WKH UHODWLRQVKLS FDQ EH H[HUFLVHG by the 
employee without sustaining any adverse toll on a frictionless basis. The cost of the 
HPSOR\HH¶VH[LW(and, so, the level of dependency on the relationship) is calculated in terms 
of the degree to which his engagement in the social relationship with the employer is 
involuntary. This is equated to the net expected costs of exit, i.e. (1) the overall value of the 
H[LVWLQJSRVLWLRQMXGJHGIURPWKHHPSOR\HH¶Vsubjective viewpoint, less (2) the overall value 
of the next best job in the labour market, plus (3) the transaction costs and risks of the 
employee moving from the existing position to the alternative one.31 As suchWKHµW\SLFDOO\
KLJKGLVSODFHPHQW¶32 financial, psychological, emotional and other costs33 of the individual 
employee exiting the social relationship operate as a deterrent from him/her doing so. 
                                                          
30 See the recommendations in *'DYLGRY³6XERUGLQDWLRQY'RPLQDWLRQ([SORULQJ WKH'LIIHUHQFHV´
[x] International Journal of Labour Law and Industrial Relations [x] and $ %RJJ ³5HSXEOLFDQ 1RQ-
'RPLQDWLRQ DQG /DERXU /DZ 1HZ 1RUPDWLYLW\ RU 7URMDQ +RUVH"´  >[@ International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations [xxx]. 
31 F. Lovett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2010) 39-40 and 50. 
32 0 0RRUH ³5HFRQVWLWXWLQJ /DERXU 0DUNHW )UHHGRP &RUSRUDWH *RYHUQDQFH DQG &ROOHFWLYH :RUNHU
&RXQWHUEDODQFH´   Industrial Law Journal 398, 416 and M. Moore, Corporate Governance in the 
Shadow of the State (Oxford, Hart, 2013) 45-49. 
33 F. Lovett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2010) 39-40. 
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Nevertheless, it is possible that there will always be a measure of exit costs in all cases, since 
social, psychological and other factors ± which will often be high ± have to be factored into 
account, albeit that they are a challenge to gauge. For this reason, some modification to 
/RYHWW¶Vscheme is suggested and WKHµLQDELOLW\WRVSUHDGULVNV¶DQGRWKHUVRFLRORJLFDOIDFWRUV
(i.e. not merely financial risks/costs and rewards) are adopted instead as the basis for the 
dependency variable. 
Pursuant to this modified domination-based framework, labour laws would be perceived 
as a set of interlinked principles and rules that aim to reduce the domination of an employee 
within the context of a specific employment relationship. This reformulation would cast 
labour laws as rules crafted in order WR  VXEMHFW WKHHPSOR\HU¶Vdiscretion to exercise its 
powers of direction and co-ordination at its will or pleasure, as well the degree of 
subordination of the employee, to external and effective constraints, (2) level down the 
degree of dependency of the employee on the employer by modifying the operation of the 
labour market and the specifics of their particular relationship, and/or (3) adjust the level of 
arbitrary discretion enjoyed by the employer by subjecting it to limitations. This normative 
construction of the role of labour law in minimising domination is at odds with that of Lovett 
DQG3HWWLWDOWKRXJKWKHODWWHUWRDOHVVHUH[WHQW/RYHWW¶VVFKHPHVXSSOLHVDXVHIXOGHILQLWLRQ
RI µGRPLQDWLRQ¶ DV D FRQFHSW EXW LW LV WKH VHW RI SROLF\ SUHVFULSWLRQV that he proposes ± 
comprising a universal and unconditional basic income, the safeguarding of a free labour 
market and an effective right to quit employment including rules limiting or prohibiting 
restrictive covenants, garden leave and arguably some unfair dismissal, wrongful dismissal 
and redundancy laws (as a means of freeing up, and lowering the cost of hires for employers) 
± that envisages a restricted body of, and bankrupt role for, labour laws.34 Instead, under the 
DXWKRUV¶IUDPHZRUNLWLVDVVXPHGWKDWsocial dependency and arbitrariness are lowered, and 
WKH HPSOR\HU¶V VRFLDO SRZHU LV FRQVWUDLQHG E\ HPSOR\PHQW ODZV thus generating the 
minimisation of domination and more redistributive arrangements in the employment 
relationship. 
 
 
3. The strengths of non-domination theory 
 
We now take the step of abstracting non-domination theory from the civic republican 
tradition and assess its general potential as an instrument to further the normative claims for 
labour laws. By doing so, we can identify several factors that may commend it as a 
justificatory account.  
Promotion of substantive and procedural fairness 
/RYHWW¶V DFFRXQW RI D VRFLDOO\ MXVW RUGHU FDQ EH XQGHUVWRRG DV RQH WKDW SURPRWHV WKH
promulgation of substantive laws which are primarily intended to reduce domination. This 
                                                          
34 This reform blueprint is based on converting a µstrategic social relationship¶ WRDµSDUDPHWULF¶ relationship in 
/RYHWW¶VVFKHPHLHDUHODWionship between employers and employees that is predicated on a labour market that 
is fully competitive, and ZKHUH WKH SULFH RI WKH HPSOR\HH¶V ODERXU FDQQRW EH determined unilaterally by the 
employer: F. Lovett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2010) 35. This is fine as far as 
it goes, but is woefully inadequate and incomplete from a protective perspective. 
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entails the exposure of a variety of private social relationships characterised by dependency 
and an arbitrary imbalance in social power to a series of effective and external controls that 
OLPLWWKHHPSOR\HU¶VµZLOORUSOHDVXUH¶. As argued above, the employment relationship is one 
such private nexus which can be characterised by dependency, arbitrariness and a power 
imbalance. Therefore, the framework advanced by Lovett speaks to labour laws as partially 
constitutive of a socially just order to the extent that it justifies policy measures that interfere 
with the arrangements, rights and obligations governing that private relationship. Where a 
contract is the foundation of that social relationship ± as in the case of employment ± the 
HIIHFW RI /RYHWW¶V µVRFLDl justice as non-GRPLQDWLRQ¶PRGHO LV WKDW WKH UHOHYDQW ODERXU ODZV
which reduce domination are perfectly justified in setting aside or diluting the express terms 
freely agreed between the parties in their employment contract. In essence, therefore, the 
claim can be made that /RYHWW¶V DUJXPHQW has the capacity to advance the cause of 
substantive fairness inasmuch as labour laws LQWHUIHUH LQ WKH VXEVWDQFH RI WKH SDUWLHV¶ 
agreement.35 This establishes a rupture from the doctrine of freedom of contract. For that 
reason, it is obviously controversial, particularly from the perspective of (1) classical liberals 
or neoliberals who prize individual autonomy as a fundamental social value, and (2) classical 
economic orthodoxy which posits that private ordering is more economically efficient than 
state-sanctioned rules.36  
/HVVFRQWURYHUVLDOKRZHYHULV3HWWLW¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIQRQ-domination as constitutive 
RIµIUHHGRP¶ According to this account, a legal system that is consistent with freedom ought 
to embed procedural protections for its citizens vertically viz-a-viz the state, but also in 
respect of private social relationships, e.g. the employer-employee nexus. In the context of 
private, horizontal social relationships in the workplace, rights affording a degree of voice to 
contest and exercise control over workplace decision-making are legitimate fair. The 
requirement for meaningful voice and control translates into rights to information, well as 
rights to consultation and negotiation with management. If such rights are to be effective, 
some additional auxiliary support is necessary, such as laws guaranteeing freedom of 
association37 and the right of workers to combine in solidarity, as well as collective 
bargaining laws,38 and laws recognising industrial action.39 Legal prescriptions of this kind 
serve to µWXUQXS¶ WKH level of bargaining power by enhancing the hand of workers in their 
                                                          
35 This is not an argument put forward by Lovett, but can be extrapolated as a suitable policy response from 
/RYHWW¶VIUDPHZRUNLHto those situations where a person or employee is subject to what Lovett understands as 
³GRPLQDWLRQ´. 
36 2(:LOOLDPVRQ³7KH/HQVRI&RQWUDFW3ULYDWH2UGHULQJ´American Economic Review 438. 
More later on the relationship between neoliberalism and civic republican theory, as well as economic 
rationalisations of the proper function of labour law. 
37
 P. Pettit, 2QWKH3HRSOH¶V7HUPVA Republican Theory and Model of Democracy, (Cambridge, CUP, 2012) 
111. 
38 For the lLQNVEHWZHHQ IUHHGRPRIDVVRFLDWLRQFROOHFWLYH ODERXU ODZSURFHGXUDO IDLUQHVVMXVWLFHDQG3HWWLW¶V
conception of µfreedom as non-domination¶, see A. Bogg and C. Estlund ³)UHHGRP RI $VVRFLDWLRQ DQG WKH
5LJKW WR &RQWHVW *HWWLQJ%DFN WR%DVLFV´ LQ $%RJJDQG71RYLW] HGV Voices at Work: Continuity and 
Change in the Common Law World (Oxford, OUP, 2014) 142-162. 
39 P. Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, OUP, 1999) 142-143. 
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negotiations with the employer.40 ,Q WKLV ZD\ XQOLNH /RYHWW¶V IRUPXODWLRQ RI µQRQ-
domination as (social) justiFH¶WKHVXEVWDQFHRIWKHDUUDQJHPHQWVULJKWVDQGREOLJDWLRQVWKDW
govern an employment relationship are left intact. Rather, the focus is on the conferral of 
procedural rights which empower workers and strengthen their position when negotiating 
with their employer on the substance of the terms of any contract. Seen from this perspective, 
labour laws conferring procedural protections act directly on the power imbalance variable 
(1) in section 2 above, whilst only indirectly touching on and reducing the dependency and 
arbitrariness elements (2) and (3) above: the latter two variables are incidentally minimised 
by virtue of the greater bargaining power afforded to workers. This can be contrasted with 
labour laws that modify or uproot the substance of the employment relationship, since they 
tend to act directly on all three of the variables (1), (2) and (3) albeit in varying strengths and 
degrees. For example, consider unfair dismissal laws which principally act on the 
arbitrariness factor, with the dependency and power imbalance elements being tuned down to 
a much lesser extent. 
Normative scope and relational coverage 
Non-domination theory can assist in identifying the normative scope and relational span of 
the discipline in the sense of (1) the distinct topics its regulatory footprint ought to cover, and 
(2) the range of individuals engaged in the personal performance of work who ought to be 
included within its protective cloak. For example, we can generalise that certain policy areas 
of labour law such as minimum wage laws, equal pay laws and working time regulations 
ought to feature in a labour law framework which invokes WKHFRQFHSWLRQRIµMXVWLFHDVQRQ-
GRPLQDWLRQ¶ as its justificatory essence, since they each function to minimise the 
opportunities available to an employer to exercise arbitrary power in what is an inherently 
imbalanced social relationship and where the weaker party, i.e. the employee, is highly 
dependent on that relationship. As such, these policy areas can be understood as rules, 
principles and doctrines forged by the common law and shaped by domestic and international 
legislation which are concerned with the minimisation of the domination exerted by an 
employer over an employee. By extrapolation, other policy prescriptions that are designed to 
re-balance the social power dynamic prevailing in relationships between an employer and 
HPSOR\HHUHGXFHWKHOHYHORIDQHPSOR\HH¶VILQDQFLDOVRFLDORUSV\FKRORJLFDOGHSHQGHQF\RQ
the employer, and/or curtail the arbitrary decision-making wielded by the employer, can also 
be rationalised under the umbrella of the non-domination model.  
 Secondly, non-domination theory can be perceived as a technique that provides 
avenues for informed law reform in the sense of extending the relational protective coverage 
of labour laws. By focusing on those private and social relationships in which one of the 
parties is engaged in the personal performance of work and is dependent on a hirer of his/her 
labour, as well as subject to an arbitrary power imbalance, the non-domination concept has 
the capacity to open up labour law to the inclusion of individuals and social relationships 
                                                          
40 %/DQJLOOH µ/DERXU/DZ¶V%DFN3DJHV¶LQ*'DYLGRYDQG%/DQJLOOHHGV Boundaries and Frontiers of 
Labour Law (Oxford, Hart, 2006) 20. 
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currently falling outside its remit.41 ,QWKLVZD\ODERXUODZ¶VUHODWLRQDOVSDQLVH[WHQGHGLet 
us take UK law as a proxy. Here, we can see that the three variables of power imbalance, 
dependency and arbitrariness outlined as (1), (2) and (3) in section 2 above are generally 
reflected not only in employment relationships but also in intermediate personal work 
relationships. Lovett himself recognises42 that domination presents itself in varying degrees. 
So, social working relationships can be set apart from each other, depending on the degree to 
which these three variables are present.  
Of course, the domination framework does not capture one of the key default rules 
governing the employment relationship in English law, namely its (ostensibly)43 permanent 
and indefinite character. At face value, this would appear to be a glaring omission in the 
model. The line of objection here is that there is a fourth variable missing from the 
GRPLQDWLRQPRGHOQDPHO\µSHUPDQHQFH¶RU µORQJ-term-QHVV¶ However, it is suggested that 
this would be short-sighted, since surely there is a theoretical foundation for labour law to 
intervene to offset variables (1), (2) and (3) in section 2 above in a short-term discrete 
FRQWUDFW IRU WKHSHUVRQDOSHUIRUPDQFHRI ZRUN"&RQVLGHU WKH µJLJ¶ HFRQRP\ where Uber44 
workers are engaged in a myriad of assignments of a short-term nature. By modifying 
/RYHWW¶V IRUPXOD WR LQVHUW DQ DGGLWLRQDO FULWHULRQ RI µSHUPDQHQFH¶ RQH LV DXWRPDWLFDOO\
discounting the scope for short-term contracts of such a kind to be characterised by 
domination. The argument is that there are significant demerits involved in taking such a step 
DQGDQ\FRQFHUQVZLWK/RYHWW¶VIRUPXODWLRQFDQ be addressed in a variety of other ways. For 
example, in comparison with traditional long-term employment relationships, we might 
decide that such short-term discrete wage-work contracts give rise to a lower level of 
domination and that as such, weaker or fewer labour laws should be introduced to act directly 
or indirectly on the power imbalance, dependency and arbitrariness factors outlined as (1), (2) 
and (3) in section 2 above. Alternatively, a more selective approach could be adopted, with 
the introduction of labour laws that tackle only one or two of these three factors, e.g. where a 
short-term contract for the personal performance of work gives rise to extreme levels of 
dependency, but only has a mild impact on the social or coercive power or arbitrary 
discretion wielded by the hirer, the labour laws could be tailored to act on that dependency 
alone. This underscores the point that the in-built flexibility in the domination model offers 
the capacity for a more discriminating approach to be adopted. Nevertheless, the end result 
would remain that short-term work-wage engagements that cannot be classified as 
employment relationships under orthodox common law rules would be considered as overlaid 
with domination and regulated by labour laws, albeit perhaps in a more diluted form. 
Bypassing weaknesses in modern liberal/liberal-contractualist-based justifications for labour 
laws 
                                                          
41 Of course, whilst this takes labour law in a progressive worker-friendly direction, it may dull the edge off of 
the claims made by [against?] WKHGLVFLSOLQH0)UHHGODQGµ)URPWKH&RQWUDFWRI(PSOR\PHQWWRWKH3HUVRQDO
:RUN 1H[XV¶   Industrial Law Journal 1, 28±9 and 0 :HLVV µ5H-,QYHQWLQJ /DERXU /DZ"¶ LQ *
Davidov and B. Langille (eds.), The Idea of Labour Law (Oxford, OUP, 2011) 48±9. 
42 F. Lovett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2010) 120-1. 
43 M. Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford, OUP, 2003) 308 and 315. 
44 See Aslam v Uber BV [2017] IRLR 4. 
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Another advantage of advancing non-domination as a rationale for labour law lies in its 
ability to bypass some of the weaknesses inherent in the standard account of modern 
liberalism (as a moral and political philosophy) (known as liberal-contractualism) to act as a 
MXVWLILFDWRU\ GULYHU IRU ODERXU ODZV 0RGHUQ OLEHUDOLVP DGRSWV WKH µQHJDWLYH¶ FRQFHSWLRQ RI
liberty adhered to by eminent thinkers such as Mill,45 Berlin,46 Bentham,47 Kant48 and 
Hobbes49 ZKR GHILQH OLEHUW\ DV µIUHHGRP IURP LQWHUIHUHQFH¶ LQ RUGHU WR HQVXUH an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VIUHHGRPWKHVWDWHVKRXOGQRWVDQFWLRQODZVLQWHUIHULQJLQWKDWLQGLYLGXDO¶VVSKHUH
of action, except in circumstances where non-interference will deprive the liberty of others or 
result in harm to others. So far so good, but if we transmit the theory of modern liberalism to 
the field of labour law, we find that it is in fact difficult to justify any labour laws at all. By 
placing restrictions and conditions on the ability of employers to co-ordinate their labour 
force, labour laws by their very nature interfere in the property rights of employers and 
freedom of contract. As such, they constrain managerial freedom. A liberal-contractualist 
framework of philosophical thought which at once seeks to advocate or justify policies which 
are redistributive in nature and/or designed to achieve formal or substantive equality, 
immediately encounters conceptual problems.50 Various solutions are offered to this 
conundrum by modern liberals to promote social and economic rights and redistribution to 
offset inequalities,51 but few are wholly convincing.52 Classic liberalism ± µDVVRFLDWHGZLWK
-RKQ/RFNH«$GDP6PLWK«$OH[LVGH7RFTXHYLOOH«DQG)ULHGULFKYRQ+D\HN«>ZKLFK@
focuses on the idea of limited government, the maintenance of the rule of law, the avoidance 
of arbitrary and discretionary power, the sanctity of private property and freely made 
FRQWUDFWVDQGWKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\RILQGLYLGXDOVIRUWKHLURZQIDWHV¶53 ± also takes issue with 
such left-leaning modern liberalism: they claim that rather than enhancing freedom, the 
prescription of modern liberals functions to reduce freedom. By redistributing resources away 
from one group to offset the existence or chance of poverty, hunger, or unemployment 
                                                          
45 Although, Mill did recognise positive duties to counter the scope for political domination: J. S. Mill, 
Principles of Political Economy with some of their Applications to Social Philosophy (1994)[1848], Book V, 
&KDSWHU;,³2QWKH*URXQGand Limits of the Laissez-Fair or Non-,QWHUIHUHQFH3ULQFLSOH´S 
46 , %HUOLQ ³7ZR &RQFHSWV RI /LEHUW\´ LQ Isaiah Berlin, Liberty, Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty, H. 
Hardy (ed) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 166-181 
47 The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring, (ed), (London, 1838-1843); Reprinted New York, 1962. 
48 The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in English ± see the references in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. 
49 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, R. Tuck (ed) (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991) chapter 21 at page 146.. 
50 6HH)/RYHWW µ'RPLQDWLRQDQG'LVWULEXWLYH-XVWLFH¶  Journal of Politics 817, 818, W. Kymlicka, 
Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford, OUP, 1990) 94-96 and 102-161, D. Enoch, 
µ$JDLQVW3XEOLF5HDVRQ¶LQ'6REHO39DOOHQW\QHDQG6:DOOHGVOxford Studies in Political Philosophy, 
Volume I (Oxford, OUP, 2015) 123-124, F. Lovett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice (Oxford, 
283   $ 5\DQ µ/LEHUDOLVP¶ LQ 5. E. Goodin, P. Pettit and T. Pogge (eds.), A Companion to 
Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2nd edn, Vol. I, (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2007) 364-365 and P. Pettit, 
µ$QDO\WLFDO3KLORVRSK\¶LQ5(*RRGLQ33HWWLWDQG73RJJHHGVA Companion to Contemporary Political 
Philosophy, 2nd edn, Vol. I, (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2007) 14-15. 
51 7KHµGLIIHUHQFHSULQFLSOH¶SRVLWHGE\5DZOV LV WKHPRVW LQIDPRXV-5DZOV A Theory of Justice (Oxford, 
OUP, 1972) 61 and 65-83. 
52 6HH $5\DQ µ/LEHUDOLVP¶ LQ 5(*RRGLQ33HWWLW DQG73RJJH HGV A Companion to Contemporary 
Political Philosophy, 2nd edn, Vol. I, (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2007) 366-368. 
53 $5\DQµ/LEHUDOLVP¶LQ5(*RRGLQ33HWWLWDQG73RJJH (eds.), A Companion to Contemporary Political 
Philosophy, 2nd edn, Vol. I, (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2007) 368. 
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suffered by another group, the VWDWH¶Vinterference in the freedom of the former group is not 
offset by the increase in freedom enjoyed by the latter group to generate a positive aggregate 
level of freedom in the round. Once the interference in the fRUPHUJURXS¶VIUHHGRPLVSXWLQ
the scales alongside the increase in the freedom of the latter group, it is not necessarily 
always the case that the latter is greater than the former, which calls into the question the 
infringement of negative liberty in this way. Furthermore, the approach of the modern liberal 
gives rise to the danger that a level of resentment and hostility is generated between the 
favoured and affected group of citizens under such a state-sanctioned redistributive system. 
%\ VWUHVVLQJ µGRPLQDWLRQ¶ WKH FLYLF UHSXEOLFDWLRQ FRQFHSWLRQ RI OLEHUW\ VKLIWV WKH
focus of enquiry away from non-interference. Rather than freedom being consistent with non-
interference, the formulation stresses an absence of domination as constitutive of freedom. 
Hence DOWKRXJK DQ HPSOR\HU¶V IUHHGRP LV VXEMHFW WR LQWHUIHUHQFH LI ODZV UHGXFH WKH
dependency of an individual on that employer, the power imbalance between those two 
SDUWLHVRUWKHH[WHQWRIWKHIRUPHU¶VDUELWUDU\GLVFUHWLRQVXFKDIRUPXODWLRQLVFRQVLVWHQW with 
a domination-based theory in the context of contemporary civic republication philosophy: 
µIUHHGRPXQGHUWKHODZ¶UDWKHUWKDQµfreedom from WKHODZ¶. As noted by Laborde: 
³« QHR-republicanism, [places] liberty at the centre of its theory, but profoundly 
alter[s] the adjacent concepts to which liberty is connected: not non-interference but 
the absence of arbitrary interference [and dependency]; not the silence of the laws but 
the presence of strong laws and institutions; not a minimal state but a protective state; 
QRWWKHIUHHGRPRIWKHSULYDWHLQGLYLGXDOEXWWKHSXEOLFVWDWXVRIWKHFLWL]HQ´54 
Unlike modern liberalism, which focuses on whether there are unwarranted laws that limit the 
LQWHUIHUHQFH ZLWK WKH HPSOR\HU¶V IUHHGRP WKH GRPLQDWLRQ IRUPXODWLRQ LQVWHDG FRQFHQWUDWHV
on the domination-reducing and freedom-enhancing effects that legal and policy prescriptions 
have on the individual employee. In this way, civic republicanism shifts the focus away from 
interference to domination, but also away from the employer to the employee. In essence, the 
VWDWH¶VLQWHUIHUHQFHLQWKHIUHHGRPRIWKHHPSOR\Hr does not feature. 
The radical difference in approach between modern liberalism and domination theory 
± DQG WKH UHDVRQ WKDW WKH LPSDFW RI ODERXU ODZV RQ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V IUHHGRP LV ODUJHO\
irrelevant ± can be illustrated with an example. By compelling employers to tone down the 
OHYHORIWKHLUDUELWUDU\SRZHUUHGXFLQJDQHPSOR\HH¶VGHSHQGHQF\RQWKHir employer or re-
balancing the power disparity in the employment relationship enjoyed by an employer, labour 
laws clearly interfere in the negative liberty of employers. Under liberal theory, that 
intervention can only be justified to the extent that any increase in the liberty of others 
outweighs the reduction in the freedom of the employer generated by those labour laws. Here, 
there is an approximate calculation or judgment that must be made. However, contrast this 
with domination theory, which has a clear advantage over classic liberalism or liberal-
contractualism. When the state intervenes in this way, the employer remains free from 
domination by the state: whilst the arbitrary power of the state over the employer may 
                                                          
54 &/DERUGHµ5HSXEOLFDQLVP¶LQ0)UHHGHQ/76DUJHQWDQG06WHDUVThe Oxford Handbook of Political 
Ideologies (Oxford, OUP, 2013) 525. 
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LQFUHDVHWKHHPSOR\HUUHPDLQVIUHHIURPDQ\GHSHQGHQF\RQWKHVWDWHVLQFHWKHHPSOR\HU¶V
exit costs vis-à-vis any vertical relationship it may have with the state are unlikely to increase 
by the introduction of labour laws and it can still spread its risks. What is particularly key is 
that the balancing exercise required under liberalism does not enter into the equation under 
the domination framework: it is only if the employer is dominated by the state that any 
theoretical problem is generated by the intervention of labour law. 
The benefits of promoting a political foundation for labour laws 
An additional strength of the non-domination model is partially connected to that discussed in 
the preceding paragraph, i.e. concerning its relationship to liberal theory. This underscores 
the point that the non-domination strand of civic republican philosophy advances a politically 
grounded justification for labour law which speaks to the construction of a set of principles 
that embody a countervailing force to the private coercive power inherent in the employment 
relationship. Such a political foundation for the subject acts as a bulwark to an economic or 
market-based rationalisation for labour ODZ¶V constituting narrative55 which occasionally 
gives the impression of being impervious to democratically sanctioned controls. One of the 
perils of advancing economic justifications for the subject is that neoclassical economic 
approaches end up colonising the debate surrounding whether labour laws ought to be 
adopted. The institutional economic approach of Keynes has given way to the neo-classical 
economic vision of Friedman and Hayek in recent times and this neoclassical school shares 
many affinities with the classic strand of liberalism in political philosophy, whose more 
PRGHUQ RIIVKRRW LV UHIHUUHG WR DV µQHROLEHUDOLVP¶ The neoliberal political philosophy is 
HVVHQWLDOO\JURXQGHGLQWKH+D\HNLDQFRQFHSWLRQRIOLEHUDOLVPDVµIUHHGRPIURPFRHUFLRQ¶56 
and pursues an agenda which promotes the proliferation of unrestricted markets, individual 
freedom, private autonomy and power, small government and few, if any, social protections. 
It is a modernised and refined version of the classic liberalist school of thought. Labour laws 
are subject to regular neoliberal and neoclassical economic assaults based on this idea of 
µIUHHGRP IURP FRHUFLRQ¶. Since the small print of domination-based reasoning stresses the 
dampening down of employee dependency and the minimisation of arbitrary social and 
coercive power, it contains elements which can have a chilling effect on challenges to its 
legitimacy which originate from the direction of neoliberal and neoclassical economic 
thought. The similar terminology adopted by civic republicans is particularly unsettling for 
the adherents of the neoliberal ideology: if a social and legal order ± such as labour law ± is 
legitimate and truly liberal insofar as it secures non-coercion in the lives of its employee 
citizens, then according to the neoliberal approach, the theoretical account of social justice as 
an absence of domination should be difficult to rebut. In this way, labour laws designed to 
promote a measure of distributive justice and equal opportunities can be cast as a form of 
social justice in reducing the degree of coercion enjoyed by the employer which is a 
                                                          
55 %/DQJLOOH µ/DERXU/DZ¶V%DFN3DJHV¶LQ*'DYLGRYDQG%/DQJLOOHHGV Boundaries and Frontiers of 
Labour Law (Oxford, Hart, 2006) 14-17. 
56 See F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London and New York, Routledge Classics, 2006) 16-20 and C. 
/DERUGH µ5HSXEOLFDQLVP¶ LQ 0 )UHHGHQ / 7 6DUJHQW DQG 0 6WHDUV The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Ideologies (Oxford, OUP, 2013) 530-531. 
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legitimate endeavour consistent with freedom. The non-domination framework also has the 
attraction of subordinating the economic to the political in the sense that it recognises the 
central role of politics to descriptive and normative accounts of labour law. In the same way, 
the economic logic of the market is afforded less priority than the democratic.57 
Focus on an employment relationship, as well as the labour market generally 
Like all markets, the labour market is subject to market failures. Contract law, and 
specialised areas of contract law, such as consumer law, will address these generic 
imperfections in the market. Labour laws are occasionally justified in such generic terms. In 
RWKHUZRUGVWKDWODERXUODZLVGHVLJQHGWRµFXUH¶HUDGLFDWHRUFXUWDLOVXFKLPSHUIHFWLRQV in 
the labour market. Indeed WKDW LV WKHXQGHUO\LQJSUHPLVHRI WKH µODZRI WKH ODERXUPDUNHW¶
account of labour laws. This formulation stresses the role of labour laws in addressing market 
failures generated by imperfect information, transaction costs, the absence of full rationality 
in the behaviour of the average employer and employee in an employment relationship, 
barriers to entry and exit to the average employment relationship, as well as opportunistic and 
coercive behaviour.  
Of course, it is true up to a point that labour laws can be conceived in these abstract 
terms. But it does not capture the full picture, since LW LV µYHU\ GLIILFXOW WR PDNH D PRUH
FRQFUHWHFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQH[LVWLQJ>VSHFLILF@ODERXUODZVDQGFRQFUHWHPDUNHWIDLOXUHV¶58 
Indeed, many labour laws are concerned with the eradication of employment relationship-
specific failures rather than the labour market in general. In other words, imperfections in a 
market exchange that are particular to a specific bilateral employment relationship. This point 
is illustrated if our attention moves to the operation of the proportionality test in workplace 
indirect discrimination cases. The self-modulating character ± in its content and functioning ± 
of this standard of review suggests that it harbours an abiding preoccupation with specific 
employment contracts: if the degree of harm suffered by an employee on the basis of a 
protected characteristic (such as race, sex, disability, etc.) is severe, then if the employer 
wishes to escape liability, the more acute and pressing its need must be to apply the relevant 
provision, criterion or practice to achieve the proffered legitimate aim.59 The fact that the 
standard that the employer requires to discharge eases in proportion to any fall in the degree 
of harm experienced by the employee simply drives the point home: that as well as governing 
                                                          
57 To that extent, theories of non-domination share certain characteristics with reformulations of the discipline of 
ODERXU ODZ LQ WHUPV RI WKH ODERXU FRQVWLWXWLRQ LH WKDW µSROLWLFV PDWWHUV¶ LQ FRQWUDVW WR WKH DVVHUWLRQ WKDW
µHFRQRPLFV PDWWHUV¶ E\ XQGHUVFRULQJ WKH LQKHUHQWO\ SROLWLFDO IHDWXUHV RI ODERXU ODZV R. Dukes, The Labour 
Constitution (Oxford, OUP, 2015). 
58
 G. Davidov, A Purposive Approach to Labour Law (Oxford, OUP, 2016) 51. Davidov argues this point by 
reference to labour legislation ZKLFKJLYHVZRUNHUVWKHEHQHILWRIµWHQYDFDWLRQGD\V¶DQGDQLQH-hour limit on 
daily working time. In other words, why ten days and not fourteen days, and why nine hours instead of ten 
hours?  
59 For example, in UK law, see Hampson v Department of Education and Science [1990] 2 All ER 25, Barry v 
Midland Bank [1999] 3 All ER 974, 984e-986g per Lord Nicholls and R (Elias) v Secretary of State for Defence 
[2006] 1 WLR 3213, 3246B-3251E per Lord Justice Mummery. 
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the operation of employment relationships in the abstract, labour law also governs their 
particularities.60  
%XW ZKDW LV WKH UHOHYDQFH RI WKLV GLVFXVVLRQ WR /RYHWW¶V QRQ-domination account in 
civic republican philosophy? Fundamentally, what is striking about non-domination is its 
ability to provide a degree of conceptual ballast for the legal techniques in labour law which 
regulate particular employment relationships on a context-specific basis, rather than generic 
employment relationships in the labour market, i.e. standards of review in labour law.61 The 
point to be made here is that there is a link between (1) the WKHRU\¶VUHODWLRQDOFRQFHUQIRUWKH
minimisation of domination in individual private arrangements, (2) the labour law techniques 
adopted in respect of the regulation of individual employment relationships and (3) self-
modulating standards of review of managerial behaviour in labour law. For example, the link 
between factors (1) ± (3) is brought clearly into focus in the context of the proportionality 
standard of review in indirect discrimination law which renders practices of the employer 
unlawful if they have a disparate adverse impact on certain persons, unless objectively 
justifiable. Likewise in the case of WKHµUDQJHRIUHDVRQDEOHUHVSRQVHV¶VWDQGDUGRIUHYLHZLQ
the law of unfair dismissal in UK law, which specifically enjoins employment tribunals and 
courts to take into account the size of the employer and administrative resources available to 
it when evaluating whether its decision to dismiss was reasonable in the circumstances.62 
Here, the case law endorses the application of a heightened concentration of scrutiny in terms 
of the range of reasonable responses test where the consequences of a misconduct dismissal 
for the employee are particularly serious and grave.63 7KH VDPH µVHOI-PRGXODWLQJ QRUPV¶
point can be made about the common law implied term of mutual trust and confidence in UK 
law, inasmuch as in certain circumstances, LWVµELWH¶ZLOOYDU\DFFRUGLQJWRWKHHPSOR\PHQW
relationship concerned, rather than by reference to the labour market in general. For example, 
from employer to employer, there will be variations in the nature of DQHPSOR\HH¶Vlegitimate 
expectations that will be protected pursuant to the implied term, as in the case of what 
FRQVWLWXWHV µUHDVRQDEOH¶ QRWLFH LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI that WHUP¶V FRQWURO RI PRELOLW\ FODXVHV LQ
employment contracts.64 Seen from this perspective, the modest claim can be made that the 
domination approach can be used to justify self-modulating labour law norms and standards 
                                                          
60 The argument is not being presented here, however, that all laws particular to employment law may be 
characterised as concerned with the correction of employment relationship-specific failures. For example, as the 
National minimum wage as a legal concept is particular to employment law, but can be treated as a law that is 
dedicated to addressing general failures in the labour market. 
61 See '&DEUHOOL ³7KH+LHUDUFK\RI'LIIHULQJ%HKDYLRXUDO6WDQGDUGVRI5HYLHZ LQ/DERXU/DZ´ 
Industrial Law Journal '&DEUHOOL³Rules and Standards in the Workplace: A Perspective from the field 
RI/DERXU/DZ´Legal Studies 21, and G. Davidov, A Purposive Approach to Labour Law (Oxford, 
OUP, 2016) 163-196, Alon-6KHQNHUDQG*'DYLGRY³$SSO\LQJWKe Principle of Proportionality in Employment 
DQG /DERXU /DZ &RQWH[WV´   McGill Law Journal  DQG * 'DYLGRY ³7KH 3ULQFLSOH RI
3URSRUWLRQDOLW\ LQ /DERU /DZ DQG LWV ,PSDFW RQ 3UHFDULRXV :RUNHUV´   Comparative Labor Law & 
Policy Journal 63. 
62 Employment Rights Act 1996, s. 98(4). 
63 A v B [2003] IRLR 405, Salford Royal NHS Foundation Trust v Roldan [2010] ICR 1457 and Turner v East 
Midland Trains Ltd. [2013] ICR 525, 541C-E per Elias LJ. 
64 For a broader discussion and additional examples of the variable intensity of scrutiny associated with the 
LPSOLHG WHUP RI PXWXDO WUXVW DQG FRQILGHQFH VHH $ %RJJ µBournemouth University Higher Education 
Corporation v Buckland: Re-establishing Orthodoxy DW WKH([SHQVHRI&RKHUHQFH"¶  Industrial Law 
Journal 408, 415-417. 
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of managerial review, by enlarging a wRUNHU¶VIUHHGRPLQRQHHPSOR\PHQWUHODWLRQVKLSPRUH
rigorously ± where that is required - than in another employment relationship. 
 
4.  Some objections to the Domination-based account 
 
Notwithstanding the merits of the factors discussed in section 3, there are a number of 
objections,65 which taken cumulatively, suggest that the non-domination strand of civic 
republican theory may be insufficient to act as a general justification for labour laws. Instead, 
with various caveats and modifications, the proposition is advanced that different strands of 
non-GRPLQDWLRQ HJ 3HWWLW DV ZHOO DV /RYHWW¶V DSSURDFK FDQ EH DGRSWHG WR DGYDQFH D
foundation for specific labour laws only, a brief flavour of which will be sketched out in the 
concluding section.  Hence, on balance, whilst some of the objections to the domination 
account can be contested, taken as a whole, the criticisms are of sufficient substance to 
outweigh any claim it may purport to make to be a comprehensive and normative basis for 
the subject. 
 
Too individualistic and relational 
 
A line of objection to the domination-based construct is that it unduly stresses individualism 
and autonomy-based conceptions as foundations for the subject of labour law at the expense 
of its traditional roots in collectivism and solidarity. A closely connected charge is that the 
theory is excessively rooted in bilateral relationships66 and thus fails to account for structural 
disadvantages and group or economic subordination experienced by employees as a result of 
the basic composition and operation of the labour market.67 This point is twofold. First, that 
3HWWLW¶VDQG/RYHWW¶VPRGHOV are far too much rooted on the individual to be useful as a theory 
for labour law which is collective/solidaristic in nature.68 Both discount the possibility of 
domination in an agentless context. Secondly, that its relational core reduces its relevance as 
a basis for labour laws insofar as it cannot account for laws tackling the group/economic 
subordination and structural dependency experienced by employees generally in the market. 
In other words, that it has little scope to explain labour laws that seek to relieve the reliance 
                                                          
65 Section 4 is not intended to supply an exhaustive account of every objection. For example, the accusation that 
latching on to the civic republican philosophy is simply another attempt to re-market labour law and shield it 
from the challenges it faces, is not addressed here. For a comprehensive note of the various criticisms, see G. 
'DYLGRY³6XERUGLQDWLRQY'RPLQDWLRQ([SORULQJWKH'LIIHUHQFHV´>[@International Journal of Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations [x] and $ %RJJ ³5HSXEOLFDQ 1RQ-Domination and Labour Law: New 
1RUPDWLYLW\ RU 7URMDQ +RUVH"´  >[@ International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations [xxx]. 
66 See the discussion in F. Lovett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2010) 47-49 and 
33HWWLW³)UHHGRPLQWKH0DUNHW´3ROLWLFV3hilosophy and Economics 131, 138-140. 
67 6HH*'DYLGRY³6XERUGLQDWLRQY'RPLQDWLRQ([SORULQJWKH'LIIHUHQFHV´>[@ International Journal 
of Labour Law and Industrial Relations [x]. 
68 For some reflections on this issue from the perspective of political theory, see the distinction drawn between 
social atomism/individualism and holismFROOHFWLYLVPLQ33HWWLWµ$QDO\WLFDO3KLORVRSK\¶LQ5(*RRGLQ3
Pettit and T. Pogge (eds.), A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2nd edn, Vol. I, (Oxford, 
Blackwell Publishing, 2007) 26-27. 
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of employees on wage labour for subsistence and a living and the structural disparity in the 
distribution of resources between employers and employees in the marketplace, which are by 
and large ³H[WHUQDO´WRWKH specific private law bargain they have struck.  
Taken at face value, the various texts may make it seem straightforward to rebut these 
criticisms. For example, it has been argued that the civic republican tradition embeds a 
pluralistic and collectivist identitarian philosophy not unlike some of the hallmarks of the 
communitarian criticism of mainstream liberalism.69 For example, civic republicanism:  
 
³relie[s], instead, on pride in shared institutions and practices, insofar as these 
SURPRWHG GHPRFUDF\ IUHHGRP DQG HTXDOLW\« >LQFOXGLQJ D@ VHQVH RI FROOHFWLYH
identity and of shared purposes emerg[ing] from participation in common life, rather 
than being pre-UHTXLVLWHV IRU LW« >L@W LV QR VXUSULVH WKHUHIRUH WKDW KLJK-profile 
communitarian philosophers, such as Charles Taylor (1989) and Michael Sandel 
(1996) had by the early 1990s professed allegiance to republicanism, and went on 
greatly to contribute to LWVGHYHORSPHQW´70  
 
Laborde explores this point, noting WKDW3HWWLW¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIFLYLFUHSXEOLFDQLVPallies it to 
µSURJUHVVLYHFDXVHVVXFKDVZRUNHUV¶ ULJKWV >DQG@ZRPHQ¶VULJKWV¶71 Dagger builds on this 
idea when he posits that in the republican civic economy, the nature and conditions of work 
in the workplace will be taken seriously, to the extent that losses in efficiency in the context 
of trades of goods and services in the econoP\ ZLOO EH DEVRUEHG DQG WROHUDWHG µZKHQ
necessary to make work more conducive to self-JRYHUQLQJFLWL]HQVKLS¶72 Pettit points out that 
measures must be put in place to limit or control the power of the employer to fire at will, 
thus necessitating more formal and meaningful legal interference into the common law 
unrestricted reasonable notice rule, 73 HJ E\ UHFRXUVH WR µMXVW FDXVH¶ UXOHV74 Building on 
these points, one can envisage a civic-republican domination-based account of employment 
law as providing strong support for the emergence of collective rights as a centre of 
countervailing power to employers that would enable the domination existing in individual 
employment relationships to be dented. Furthermore, democratic control of the workplace 
through collective rights could be validated under the domination framework. 
                                                          
69 &/DERUGHµ5HSXEOLFDQLVP¶LQ0)UHHGHQ/76DUJHQWDQG06WHDUVThe Oxford Handbook of Political 
Ideologies (Oxford, OUP, 2013) 516. 
70 &/DERUGHµ5HSXEOLFDQLVP¶LQ0)UHHGHQ/76DUJHQWDQG06WHDUVThe Oxford Handbook of Political 
Ideologies (Oxford, OUP, 2013) 516. See also A. RyaQ µ/LEHUDOLVP¶ LQ5(*RRGLQ, P. Pettit and T. Pogge 
(eds.), A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2nd edn, Vol. I, (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 
2007) 361-362. 
71 &/DERUGHµ5HSXEOLFDQLVP¶LQ0)UHHGHQ/76DUJHQWDQG06WHDUVThe Oxford Handbook of Political 
Ideologies (Oxford, OUP, 2013) 520. 
72 5'DJJHU ³1HR-UHSXEOLFDQLVPDQG WKHFLYLFHFRQRP\´ Politics, Philosophy and Economics 151, 
162. 
73 P. Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, OUP, 1997) 141-142, P. Pettit, On 
the PeopOH¶V 7HUPV A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy, (Cambridge, CUP, 2012) 115, and R. 
'DJJHU³1HR-UHSXEOLFDQLVPDQGWKHFLYLFHFRQRP\´Politics, Philosophy and Economics 151, 162. 
74 For the possibilities, see *'DYLGRYDQG((VKHWµ,QWHUPHGLDWH$SSURDFKHVWR8QIDLU'LVPLVVDO3URWHFWLRQ¶
(2015) 44 Industrial Law Journal  * 'DYLGRY µ,Q 'HIHQFH RI (IILFLHQWO\ $GPLQLVWHUHG µ-XVW &DXVH¶
'LVPLVVDO/DZV¶International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 117; and 
-+RZH µ3ROHV $SDUW"7KH&RQWHVWDWLRQ%HWZHHQ WKH ,GHDVRI1R)DXOW 'LVPLVVDO DQG8QIDLU'LVPLVVDO IRU
3URWHFWLQJ-RE6HFXULW\¶Industrial Law Journal 122. 
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Having said all this, XQGHU /RYHWW¶V DQG 3HWWLW¶V QRUPDWLYH VFKHPHV IRU PLQLPLVLQJ
domination, whilst legitimized by the republican non-domination construct, the case for 
various collective freedoms such as the freedoms of assembly and association  together with 
state protection and recognition for trade unions and collective bargaining,75 is extremely 
weak. In addition, the interpersonal, bilateral and relational nature of the non-structural 
DFFRXQWRIGRPLQDWLRQLQ3HWWLW¶VDQG/RYHWW¶VIRUPXODWLRQUHQGHUV it impracticable to target 
market or social inequalities at the collective level of labour laws. Admittedly, Pettit 
recognises the merits of collective action in certain circumstances when WKLVVHUYHVWR³ZUHVW
ZRUNHUV IURP XQGHU WKH VSHFWUH RI GHVWLWXWLRQ´.76 However, such a justification is hardly 
entirely supportive of collective bargaining and fails to act as a driver for anything other than 
the status quo in the context of UK collective labour law. It underplays and undermines the 
role of collective bargaining and the collective protection of workers since at the very core of 
the neo-republican account of domination rests the denial that disparities in the underlying 
distribution of property or various features of the labour market can of themselves, give rise 
to domination. According to their formulation, they are agnostic (possibly hostile) about legal 
intervention where the effects of the labour market and property system ± just like the natural 
environment ± are inegalitarian in outcome, or warrant concern, since such markets and 
patterns of distribution cannot be a source of domination. And if there is no domination, there 
is no justification for law or regulation since individuals are free and the social order is just. 
Owing to the fact that collective labour laws are generally justified on the ground that the 
challenges experienced by workers as a class are socially and market-constituted,77 rather 
than rooted in a series of individual interpersonal relationships between workers and their 
employers, this opens up clear deficits in the ability of neo-republican domination to act as a 
base for collective bargaining laws, industrial action laws and freedom of association.  
 
Overall, these objections to the domination-based model which criticise its individualistic and 
relational nature have a great deal of merit inasmuch as they each speak to the argument that 
it can only account for certain kinds of labour laws at best. This underscores the mismatch 
between the collectivist origins of the subject and the non-domination civic republicans. This 
absence of fit is essentially attributable to the lack of structural base to domination theory, 
which is a cornerstone of other civic republican accounts advanced by commentators such as 
Gourevitch;78 and it evokes the distinct impression that /RYHWW¶VDQG3HWWLt¶VPRGHO can only 
act as a justificatory basis for individual and relational laws. 
 
Too selective as a general justification 
 
                                                          
75 3HWWLWFDVWVWKHVHDVµRSWLRQV¶WKDWRXJKWWREHµVFUHHQHGLQ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Theory and Model of Democracy, (Cambridge, CUP, 2012) 115. 
76 P. Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, OUP, 1997) 142. 
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 P. Davies and M. Freedland (eds), Kahn-)UHXQG¶V/DERXUDQGWKH/DZ, 3rd edition (London, Stevens, 1983) 
17. 
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 $ *RXUHYLWFK µ/DERU DQG UHSXEOLFDQ OLEHUW\¶ 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 Constellations 431, $ *RXUHYLWFK  µ/DERU
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Political Theory 591, 599-609 and A. Gourevitch, 
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A second criticism of the non-domination account is that it may be WRRµVHOHFWLYH¶D
goal for labour law. To put this point in perspective, Davidov79 divides the range of potential 
objectives for labour law LQWRDVSHFWUXPZLWKµVHOHFWLYH¶JRDOVDWWKHZRUNHU-protective end, 
and those which are µXQLYHUVDO¶DWWKHRWKHU. Selective goals promote the interests of workers 
only, whereas universal goals are concerned with regulatory intervention where it is of 
benefit for all groups, such as employers as well as employees, and society in general. Non-
GRPLQDWLRQ LV µVHOHFWLYH¶ in nature80 for two reasons: first, as explained above, it is 
sufficiently nuanced to advance the case for laws targeting employment relationship-specific 
failures as well as general labour market imperfections; and secondly, it condones labour 
laws prioritising the interests of workers over broader societal considerations. The line of 
objection here is that the adoption of selective goals for labour laws VXFKDVµGRPLQDWLRQ¶KDV
the potential to craft a rigid justificatory pillar for the discipline which is unresponsive to 
changes in underlying social, economic and political conditions. The danger is that it creates 
an inability to move with the times, so that the basis of the subject becomes irrelevant. This 
can be contrasted with universalist justifications that are more flexible in orientation such as 
WKH µODZRI WKH ODERXU PDUNHW¶ FRQVWUXFW which are more likely to command much broader 
public backing and less likely to be captured by sectional interests. For this reason, it is 
argued that such broad-based factors are preferable as a hinge upon which to justify labour 
laws.  
One can respond to this charge by arguing that the domination framework does not 
exclusively focus on the promotion of laws that are good for employees, but also includes 
certain goals such as democratic deliberative decision-making secured through procedural 
labour rights. Labour laws conferring procedural protections on dismissal/redundancy can be 
supported on the basis of non-domination theory. These afford a certain degree of procedural 
fairness in favour of workers by enabling them to contest and control workplace decisions 
affecting them in an individual capacity. However, they also enhance democratic 
participation by incentivising a degree of self-governance in the workplace. For this reason, 
non-domination can be cast as a µPLG-VSHFWUXP¶ objective,81 concerned at once with the 
protection of workers as well as wider concerns, such as the advancement of democratic 
participation in the workplace.  
 
Free consent 
 
The third criticism of the non-domination theory is based on the concept of free 
consent, i.e. that the wage-dependent labourer, having submitted to a state of domination and 
traded independence in return for income security and continuity of work,82 must accept 
his/her lot. This raises the question as to why (and whether) the law should step in to protect 
                                                          
79 G. Davidov, A Purposive Approach to Labour Law (Oxford, OUP, 2016) 69-70. 
80 It could be argued that non-domination is too universal as a goal owing to its broadly political character, but 
on balance, albeit political, its ultimate aims are to strengthen the hand of the weaker party to a bilateral social 
relationship, which will invariably be the employee in the case of employment. 
81 See the discussion in L. Rodgers, Labour Law, Vulnerability and the Regulation of Precarious Work 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2016) 41-45 and 92-93. 
82 See Herbert Simon, H6LPRQµ$IRUPDOWKHRU\RIWKHHPSOR\PHQWUHODWLRQ¶Econometrica 293±
305 and G. Davidov, A Purposive Approach to Labour Law (Oxford, OUP, 2016) 103-107. 
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him/her. An argument based on free consent SRVLWVWKDWWKHZRUNHU¶VIUHHO\JLYHQFRQVHQWWR
domination is sufficient to relieve the state from passing protective laws.83 Despite the 
elegance of this simple logic, tKHµFRQVHQW¶REMHFWLRQassumes WZRWKLQJVILUVWWKDWµFRQVHQW¶
is freely given. This assumption neglects to factor in the general reliance of employees on 
ZDJHODERXUIRUVXEVLVWHQFHVRDQDEVHQFHRIWUXHDQGµIUHH¶FKRLFHDVWRZKHWKHUWRDFFHSW
HPSOR\PHQW6HFRQGWKHµFRQVHQW¶REjection assumes a perfectly competitive labour where 
the employer is as dependent on the employee as the employee is on the employer, with the 
employee having the luxury of effortless diversification of his/her economic risks and 
minimal costs of exiting the employment relationship. Of course, this is a fantasy, studies 
having suggested the impracticability of constructing a real-life labour market such as this.84 
As such, although the common law in the UK VXSSRUWVWKHHPSOR\HH¶VIUHHGRPWRTXLW85 and 
freedom of contract86 (for optimal express terms), his/her consent is essentially an illusion, 
masking his/her individual and structural dependency and subordination, as well as the 
economic necessity of work. In this way, as noted by Collins,87 there is a case to be made for 
WKHSURSRVLWLRQWKDWWKHZRUNHU¶VFRQVHQWLVYLWLDWHG. 
The transplantability of non-domination 
 
The fourth objection relates to the transplantability of the non-domination theory and 
its use as a justificatory account for labour law. Civic republican theories have their origin in 
the justification of concepts, constructs and institutions which enable citizens to act as free, 
undominated persons. The primary concerns of political philosophers are thus with justice 
and freedom, which are not normally the central concerns or aims of labour law. Allied to this 
LVWKHIDFWWKDWSROLWLFDOSKLORVRSKHUVDVVXPHDFRQWULYHGµQDWXUDOVWDWH¶RUµRULJLQDOSRVLWLRQ¶
with no laws or power dynamics in place which can then serve as a template within which to 
construct ideals of freedom and justice. The rationale for labour law starts from a different 
premise: LQ LWV µQDWXUDO VWDWH¶ WKH HPSOR\PHQW UHODWLRQVKLS LV FKDUDFWerised by an inherent 
power imbalance and labour laws tend to be designed with the objective of minimising this 
disparity in mind. The concept RI µGRPLQDWLRQ¶ PD\ QRW EH WKH PRVW DSSURSULDWH ZRUG WR
describe the hierarchical employment relationship which is based on authority, co-operation 
and bureaucratic power, i.e. a more subtle and nuanced set of workplace interactions88 than 
                                                          
83 7KHµFRQVHQW¶REjection is also a challenge for liberal-contractualists and neoliberals alike. 
84 %(.DXIPDQµ7KH,PSRVVLELOLW\RID3HUIHFWO\&RPSHWLWLYH/DERXU0DUNHW¶Cambridge Journal 
of Economics 775. 
85 Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. [1940] AC 1014; Howard Johnson Co. v Detroit Local Joint 
Executive Board 417 US 249 (1974) and National Labor Relations Board v Burns International Security 
Services Inc., 406 US 272 (1972). For a distinction between employment as an institution and slavery, forced 
labour, servitude and serfdom, see $%RJJDQG&(VWOXQGµ)UHHGRPRI$VVRFiation and the Right to Contest: 
*HWWLQJ %DFN WR %DVLFV¶ LQ $ %RJJ DQG 7 1RYLW] HGV Voices at Work: Continuity and Change in the 
Common Law World (Oxford, OUP, 2014) 141, 151-162. 
86 Kahn-Freund famously identifying the freedom of contract as a kind of legal fiction: P. Davies and M. 
Freedland (eds), Kahn-)UHXQG¶V/DERXUDQGWKH/DZ, 3rd edition (London, Stevens, 1983) 18. 
87 +&ROOLQVµ/DERXULVQRWDQ,QVWUXPHQW,VWKH&RQWUDFWRI(PSOR\PHQW&RPSDWLEOH ZLWK/LEHUDOLVP"¶LQ+
Collins and V. Mantouvalou, (eds.) Philosophical Foundations of Labour Law (Oxford, OUP, forthcoming). 
88 +XJK &ROOLQV µ0DUNHW Power, Bureaucratic Power, and the Contract of Employment (1986) 15 Industrial 
Law Journal 1 and +&ROOLQV³$JDLQVW$EVWHQWLRQLVPLQ/DERXU/DZ´Ln J. Eekelaar & J. Bell (eds.), Oxford 
Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford, OUP, 1987) 79, 92-100. 
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ZKDWLVHQYLVDJHGXQGHU3HWWLW¶V89 DQG/RYHWW¶VVFKHPHVThe use of the language of political 
philosophy and its application to labour law is thus a process riddled with difficulties due to 
this difference in discourse. This is a valid objection and, taken together with the other 
criticisms versed above, makes it difficult to see how the non-domination theory can serve as 
a universal justificatory account for labour law as a subject. However, the theory, bearing in 
mind its different starting point and aims, is nonetheless attractive in that the main ideas 
underpinning civic republicanism ± freedom as non-domination, a mixed constitution and the 
contestatory citizenry ± are ideals which can act as a driver for specific labour laws and more 
specifically for a particular set of labour laws that seek to further a distinctive set of 
regulatory objectives.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
As noted in the introduction, µdomination¶ WKHRU\ in civic republican thought can supply a 
link between accounts of the law of the contract of employment90 and political philosophy. 
:KLOVWWKHDXWKRUVUHMHFW/RYHWW¶VDQG3HWWLW¶VWHFKQLTXHVIRUWKHUHGXFWLRQRIGRPLnation as 
impoverished, their descriptive account of private relations imbued with domination is 
accepted (subject to modifications) as a useful basis on which to build a basis for legal 
intervention in the employment relationship. This new, but restricted µQRUPDWLYLW\¶ has the 
potential to justify labour laws of a particular kind, the shape, nature and character of that set 
of legal responses amounting to something that we aim to plot in greater detail in a future 
paper. However, if we were to distil the salient features of that scheme, and to draw out the 
various points emerging from the preceding discussion in sections 3 and 4, we can arrive at a 
normative case for a series of labour laws that are avowedly (i) individual, rather than 
collective in their configuration, (ii) relational, rather than structural in nature insofar as they 
focus on tackling the vulnerabilities experienced by individual employees to specific 
employment relationships, (iii) autonomous rather than dependent on contract, (iv) specific 
and selective, rather than general or universal in their orientation, and (v) at once substantive 
and (mildly) procedural. In the next paper, we intend to chart how these features can be fed in 
to a framework for the regulation of the law of the contract of employment. 
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